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infrastructure  and the civil-military instruments  that  the EU  has utilised.  This paper uses 
these  aspects  of  EU  policy to  advance  the  argument  that  Sub-Saharan  Africa  presents  a 
valuable case study through which to study the evolution of an embryonic strategic culture 
for the EU. 
Professor Richard G. Whitman
Professor of Politics
Department of European Studies and Modern Languages
University of Bath
Bath BA2 7AY
UK
Tel. + 44 (0)1225 386490
Fax. + 44 (0)1225 386987
Email. r.g.whitman@bath.ac.uk2
The EU and Sub-Saharan Africa: developing the strategic culture of the 
Union’s Foreign Security and Defence Policy
‘There  is  now  a  need  for  a  new  phase  in  the  Africa-EU  relationship,  a  new  strategic 
partnership and a Joint Africa-EU Strategy as a political vision and roadmap for the future 
cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas.’ 1
‘Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle 
of  weak  governance  and  recurring  conflict.  We  have  sought  to  break  this,  both  through 
development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of postconflict stabilisation 
and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. 
This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local 
stakeholders.’2
1. Introduction
The  EU’s  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP)  and  its  attendant 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have had an engagement with 
Sub-Saharan Africa as a central strand of activities since their foundation.3
Commentary  upon this Sub-Saharan  African  strand  of  the  CFSP/ESDP  has 
consequently been an important component of the wider literature describing 
the  evolution  of  the  ESDP.4 To-date  this  literature  on  the  CFSP/ESDP  and 
Africa has for the most part sought to explore CFSP towards third countries 
and  issues  and individual  ESDP  operations  and  activities  as  the  EU  has 
engaged in more activity which, in turn, have provided scholars with greater 
opportunities for empirical work. 
The interest for this paper in the SB of the EU means that the focus is not on 
the  fully  array  of  the  EU’s  CFSP  towards  Sub-Saharan  Africa  but  rather 
limited towards examination of its ESDP operations. We now have a range of 
studies  which  have  examined  the  ESDP  operations  in  some  depth. Sub-
Saharan Africa is of considerable interest as a ‘test-bed’ of ESDP activity as 
almost the full panoply of both civilian and military types of ESDP activity 3
have been used on the continent since the initiation of ESDP activities in 2003. 
The EU has deployed military operations in support of Petersberg tasks, peace 
support  operations,  policing  and  police  support  operations,  security  sector 
reform operations,  (and only rule of law and border assistance missions have 
not  been  utilised). And  furthermore  Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  been  the  sole 
location  for  some distinctive  military  operations:  the  ESDP’s  first  naval 
operation  EUNAVFOR,  the  Artemis  non-Berlin  +  operation  and  the  AMIS
peace support operation. With nine of the EU’s total of twenty three ESDP 
operations  to-date  taking  place  in  Sub  Saharan  Africa  the  continent  has 
therefore been an important theatre of operations for the development of the 
operational  practices  of  the  ESDP. This  has  given  rise  to  a particular 
characteristic to the EU’s strategic behaviour and which we will explore in 
section 5 below. 
Examining  the  decision-making  processes  that  resulted  in  some  of  these 
operations has also been an important generator of theoretical insight. Case 
study analysis has been used to analyse EU decision-making processes as the 
basis for accounting for particular policy outcomes.5 We will side-step these 
decision-making processes in the body of this paper but return to this issue in 
the conclusion to the paper.
Where there is currently a gap in the literature is the extent to which the EU’s 
ESDP activities in Sub-Saharan Africa have contributed to the development of 
an  EU  ‘Strategic  Culture’.  This  paper  contends  that  there  has  been  an 
analytical neglect of the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa to the refinement 
of the EU’s definition of what constitute security threats, how these threats are 
seen by the EU to be particularly acute on the African continent, and how the 
EU  has  used  its  foreign,  security  and  defence  policy  interventions  on  the 
continent to test and refine its policy instruments.4
As  an  attempt  to  generate  a  debate  on  the  relationship  between  the  EU’s 
ESDP activities in Sub-Saharan Africa and its Strategic Culture this paper is 
very much a preliminary exercise in theoretical and empirical agenda setting. 
The paper is intended as something of a tentative exercise to facilitate further 
and future empirical work.
The paper proceeds by introducing the notion of Strategic Culture as applied 
to  the  EU  before  then  seeking  to  refine  the  concept.  It  then  makes  a 
preliminary examination of what is considered to be a symbiotic relationship 
between the EU’s Strategic Culture and Sub-Saharan Africa.
2. An EU Strategic Culture?
Debate around whether the EU possesses a Strategic Culture has been on-
going since the foundation of the ESDP in the late 1990s.  The central issue of 
debate is whether the EU is developing a Strategic Culture and, furthermore, 
what are its characteristics? Why is the notion of the EU’s possession, or not, 
of  a  Strategic  Culture  of  such  importance?  To  address  this  question  it  is 
necessary to briefly examine the wider literature on generic strategic cultures 
in addition to the literature that deals specifically on EU Strategic Culture.
Strategic Culture defined
The literature on Strategic Culture (SC) is concerned with the assertion that 
there  is  a  relationship  between  the  strategies  pursued  by  individual 
international  actors  and  that  these  actors  ‘…have  different  predominant 
strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of 
the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, 
cultural, cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.’65
Literature on SC developed during the Cold War with a predominant focus 
on  the  two  superpowers  and  with  generalisations  about  the  superpowers 
appetites  for  risk  and  the  propensities  in  the  use  of  force used  to  inform 
strategies for the conduct of nuclear war in the U.S.7 From this starting point 
has emerged  a  burgeoning  literature  that  examines  the  SC  of  a  variety  of 
states, including those of individual EU member states.8 Applying the concept 
to the EU represents a particular set of empirical and theoretical challenges as 
there is the existence of twenty seven distinctive security cultures in existence
alongside  a  putative  EU  SC.  The  interrelationship  between  the  individual 
member state security cultures and the EU’s emergent SC raises the question 
as to  whether  the  process  at  work  is symbiotic? Furthermore, if the  EU  is 
developing a SC how and where can this identified?
As with all concepts in the social sciences there is considerable contestation on 
the  deployment  of  the  notion  of  SC.  All  of  these  arguments  cannot  be 
rehearsed here. For SC theorists a key area of debate around the relationship 
between SC  and Strategic Behaviour (SB). This is a distinction which is of 
crucial relevance for study of the EU as will be explored below. For Gray SB
“means  behaviour  relevant  to  the  threat  or  use  of  force  for  political 
purposes.”9 The relationship between SC and SB can be further conceptually 
distinguished:
‘strategic culture can be conceived as a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning 
to, strategic behaviour, as the total warp and woof of matters strategic that are thoroughly 
woven together, or as both’ 10
This  distinction  between  SC  and  SB  is  important  because,  as  will  be  seen 
below, these are often conflated in discussion on the EU and SC. 6
The EU and Strategic Culture
Since the inception of the ESDP in the late 1990s there has been debate on the 
existence  of  an  EU  SC as  an  important  necessary  component  of  the  EU 
realising  its  ambitions  for  its  foreign,  security  and  defence  policy.  For  the 
most  part  this  literature  glosses-over  definitions  of SC itself  in  a  rush  to 
judgement as to whether the EU has an embryonic SC.  The nature of what is 
a SC has been much less contested than whether the EU is acquiring one. 
A dividing line within the literature on the EU and SC that Rynning identified 
in  2003  still  holds.11 Rynning  distinguished  between  optimistic  and 
pessimistic assessments on the EU’s possession of a SC. What divides these 
assessments is the conclusion as to whether the EU is gaining both the ability
and the confidence to use military force to address perceived threats to EU 
security.
The most frequently cited and well-rehearsed discussions on the EU and SC
are  the  two  companion  articles  by  Cornish  and  Edwards.12 Cornish  and 
Edwards seek to evaluate whether the EU has acquired a SC by examining 
four areas: military capabilities; whether ESDP experiences are engendering a 
sense  of  reliability  and  legitimacy  for  autonomous  EU  action;  whether 
policymaking  processes  of  the  EU  now  ensure  a  political  culture  with  the 
appropriate  level  and depth  of civil–military  integration;  and the  evolving
relationship  between  the  EU  and  NATO.  Cornish  and  Edwards  entwine
elements of SC and SB in their analysis and the conclusion drawn in 2005 is 
that the EU has a SC that is a work-in-progress.13 Four years from this analysis
– and  ten  years  from  the  foundation  of  the  ESDP  – general  stocktaking 
exercises on the ESDP conclude that the policy domain, and by implication 
the EU’s SC, is something of a curate’s egg.147
3. EU Strategic Culture and Sub-Saharan Africa: making the case
Examining  the  EU’s  SC  with  reference  to  Sub-Saharan  Africa  represents  a 
two-fold challenge. First, and as indicated above, the EU’s SC is a work in 
progress.  Second,  that  the  wider  literature  on  SC  has  not  been  applied 
systematically to the EU itself and which, consequently, does not provide a 
well-trodden path of established frameworks of analysis by which to analyse 
the  EU’s SC through examination of  policy  towards  a region, continent or 
theatre of operations. 
Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa may not appear to be the most appropriate 
case study through which to explore the EU’s SC. The Western Balkans would 
appear to be a more promising case as it has been the location of a sustained 
engagement of the EU’s foreign and security policies since the foundation of 
the  CFSP  in 1993 and  onwards through  the  development  of  the  European 
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the eventual creation of the ESDP. 
However,  there  are  two  distinct  disadvantages  that  accrue  to  such  an 
examination of the Western Balkans. The first is that the EU has defined a 
particular endpoint to its engagement with this region and which is to draw 
these states closer to the EU through a route map to EU accession.  The second 
is that there have actually been more ESDP operations that have take place in 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  in  comparison  to  the  Western  Balkans.  15 This  is  in 
contrast to the greater number of ESDP operations launched in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (see Appendix A). 
The EU’s Sub-Saharan Africa ESDP operations therefore provide an extremely 
important case through which it is possible to examine manifestations of the 
EU’s  SB.16 As  noted  above  SB  and  SC  are  in  a  symbiotic  relationship.  By 
examining the EU’s SB, as manifested through the EU’s ESDP operations in 8
Sub-Saharan  Africa,  it  is  anticipated  that  the  paper  will  be  able  to  draw 
preliminary conclusions  on  the  wider  EU  SC.  This  will  be  attempted by 
examining two elements of the EU’s engagement with the continent. First, to 
clarify in what terms the EU has defined Sub-Saharan Africa as a theatre of 
operations  for  its  foreign,  security  and  defence  policies  there  will  be  the
examination of key Strategic Declaratory instruments used by the EU.17 Before, 
secondly, examining SB through the ESDP operations where the EU has used 
either the threat or the use of force as a policy instrument. 
4. Sub-Saharan Africa and Strategic Culture: Strategy defined. 
There is a longstanding literature which has examined the inter-relationship 
between  the  European  integration  process,  EU  member  states  and  Sub-
Saharan  Africa.  The  ECSC/EEC/EU’s  engagement  with  Sub-Saharan  Africa 
dates  to  the  commencement  of  the  European  integration  process  itself. 
Consequently, the continent is one of the oldest subjects and objects of EU 
member state collective foreign policy formation. During the period of the 
cold  war  the  member  states  foreign  policy  was  largely  pursued  through 
development  policy  instruments  and  through  the  Yaoundé  and  Lomé 
Conventions.18
The purpose of this paper is not to seek to account for the EU’s wider foreign 
policy objectives within Sub-Saharan Africa or even the full gamut of the EU’s 
CFSP towards the continent. Rather the intention is to examine the EU’s ESDP 
activities within the region to more clearly discern its SB. The wider literature 
on  the  EU  and  Africa  suggests  that  the  EU’s  policy  towards  Sub-Saharan 
Africa developed a new dimension in the 1990s with an increasing interest in 
conflict prevention and conflict management.19 This assertion will be probed 
as an important to discerning the evolution of the EU’s SB.9
Since this period, and alongside the EU’s ESDP operations, the EU used a set 
of Strategic Declaratory pronouncements which provide the framework within 
which EU policy is being defined and organised. There is hierarchy to this
informational diffusion and in this paper they will be used a markers of the 
component of the EU’s SB and which have informed the EU’s policy towards 
Sub-Saharan Africa.20 These documents are used to illustrate that the EU has 
established two  key  strands  through  its strategic  declarations:  the  security-
development nexus and the human security imperative.
European Security Strategy: Sub-Saharan Africa within the EU’s Grand Strategy
A key starting point for analysis of the EU’s strategic declarations is the EU’s 
first security strategy in December 2003.21 In the words of the Heads of State 
and Government; 
The  European  security  strategy  reaffirms  our  common  determination  to  face  our 
responsibility for guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world. It will enable the European 
Union  to  deal  better  with  the  threats  and  global  challenges  and  realise  the  opportunities 
facing us. An active, capable and more coherent European Union would make an impact on a 
global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a 
fairer, safer and more united world. 22
Furthermore, as the European Council conclusions also noted the appropriate 
consequence of the ‘strategic orientation[s]’ contained in the document was that 
they had to ‘…mainstream them into all relevant European policies,’.  Consequently the 
European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  is  supposed  to  provide  the  EU  and  its 
Member  States  with  the  road  map  for  a  route-march  to  greater  global 
impact.23
The ESS defines Europe’s security interests and priorities across three parts of 
the  document:  global  challenges  and  key  threats  - this  identifies  what  the 
document calls ‘the security environment’; strategic objectives - how to address 10
these threats; and policy implications for Europe. Sub-Saharan Africa features in 
each of these three sections of the document. 
In the identification of global challenges and key threats the document is very 
much touched by its historical moment in international relations – terrorism, 
proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime all 
appear.  In  this  section  of  the  document  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is  used  to 
illustrate a linkage between lack of development, and its linkage to political 
instability and conflict and the assertion that security is a precondition for 
development.24 This  is  an  embryonic  expression  of  the  security-development
nexus that has subsequently become a key strand in the EU’s strategy as will 
become apparent below. 
The second section of the document – on strategic objectives – identifies three 
strategic  objectives:  ‘addressing  the  threats’,  ‘building  security  in  our 
neighbourhood’  and  an  ‘international  order  based  on  effective 
multilateralism’.  ‘Effective  multilateralism’  has  become  an  overwhelming 
objective of the ESS. It is the EU’s equivalent of the U.S. cold war notion of 
containment as the key objective of the EU internationally. In this section of the 
Strategy Sub-Sahran Africa appears as illustrative of the manner in which the 
EU has already addressed threats (with reference to the DRC – ‘to help deal 
with  regional  conflicts  and  to  put  failed  states  back  on  their  feet’)  and  as 
illustrative that ‘State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected 
– as we have seen in West Africa.’ Sub-Saharan Africa is not defined as part of 
the neighbourhood but appears later in the document as ‘partner’ alongside 
Latin America and Asia. The African Union features as a component of the 
argument  for  effective  multilateralism  and  the  assertion  that  regional 
organisations strengthen global governance. 11
The third section of the document is almost all about capabilities development 
which has been a collective concern since the early 1990s and West Africa is 
used  as  illustrative  of  the  assertion  that  ‘Problems  are  rarely  solved  on  a 
single country basis’. Strikingly, and unlike its references to other continents 
the EU did not identify an African candidate for the ‘strategic partnerships’ 
that it was seeking to develop. 
In its December 2008 five year review of the implementation of the Security 
Strategy the EU  has summarised the  foreign and security policy  evolution 
generally,  and for the purposes of this paper,  how Sub-Saharan Africa fits 
within the EU’s wider grand strategy.25 Human Security is enshrined in the 
review  document  as  a  central  concept  for  the  EU.  The  refinement  of  this 
concept as a guiding principle for the EU was an important element of the 
work undertaken to implement the ESS after its publication.26 There is also a
section of the document devoted to the security-development nexus and with 
Somalia cited as illustrative of the inter-linkage. Guinea- Bissau and the DRC 
are both cited as instances where the EU’s intervention has been driven by the 
drive  for  post-conflict  stabilisation  and  reconstruction.  This  documentation 
represents a good snap-shot of the various strands of the EU’s policy towards 
the region as they have consolidated over the last half decade. Stress is also 
placed on how the EU is working with the AU and also how the Joint Africa 
EU  Strategy  is being used  as  a  vehicle  through  which  to  enhance  African 
capabilities in crisis management. There is also reference to the development 
of a more significant relationship with South Africa since 2003. 
The EU’s Security Strategy and its implementation across the last five years 
provide key indicators to the EU’s SB and which are echoed in key documents 12
that deal specifically with Sub-Saharan Africa. The key CFSP document that 
encapsulates  the  EU’s  strategic  objectives  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa  is  the 
Common  Position adopted  in January  2004  concerning conflict  prevention, 
management and resolution in Africa. 27 It establishes a number of principles 
that have guided EU policy. First, that the EU seeks to ‘…contribute to the 
prevention,  management  and  resolution  of  violent  conflicts  in  Africa  by 
strengthening African capacity and means of action in this field.’ Second, that 
to implement the policy there is close cooperation with the UN, regional and 
sub-regional organisations. Third, that conflict prevention, management and 
resolution needs to be tackled through capacity building at the international, 
regional and country level. The Common Position has been the platform on 
which  the  EU  has  developed  a  number  of  strands  to  its  policy  that  have 
focused  on  capacity-building, and  the  disarmament,  demobilisation  and 
reintegration of combatants and on combating the destabilising accumulation 
and spread of small arms and light weapons.28
Sub-Saharan African Strategic Declarations
From 2003 onwards Strategic Declaratory statements of the EU on Sub-Saharan 
Africa have contained significant reference to both the security development 
nexus and the Human Security imperative. The EU has ‘uploaded’ these two 
key  strands  of  its  strategic  behaviour  into  its  strategic  objectives  for  the 
continent.
The security-development nexus was central to the European Africa Strategy 
adopted by the EU in October 2005 with both its central objective to guide the 
EU’s  response  in  assisting  with  the  realisation  of  the  Millennium 
Development  Goals  (MDG)  with  an  objective  being  to ‘…strengthen  its 
support in the areas considered prerequisites for attaining the MDGs (peace, 13
security,  good  governance),  areas  that  create  a  favourable  economic 
environment for growth, trade and interconnection and areas targeting social 
cohesion and environment.’ 
Furthermore the EU outlined its response strategy to these objectives and this 
being that:
‘The EU will step up its efforts to foster peace and security by means of a wide range of 
actions, ranging from the support for African peace operations to a comprehensive approach 
to conflict prevention addressing the root causes of violent conflict. These actions also target 
cooperation  in  the  fight  against  terrorism  and  the  non-proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass 
destruction,  as  well  as  support  for  regional  and  national  strategies  for  disarmament, 
demobilisation,  reintegration  and reinsertion  in  order  to  contribute  to  the reintegration of 
ex-combatants – including child soldiers – and stabilisation of post-conflict situations.’ 29
This theme was reinforced at the second Africa-EU summit which was held 
from 8-9 December 2007 in Lisbon under the Portuguese EU Presidency and 
at  the  level  of heads  of  state  and  government  from Africa  and  the  EU. 
Running through the key declarations and documents agree at the summit -
the Lisbon Declaration and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy - characterised the 
relationship  as  ‘Strategic  Partnership’.  This  Partnership  is  to  be  structured 
through 8 strands and with the objectives set out in a two-year Action Plan. 
The Joint EU-Africa Strategy is replete with references to Human Security. 
The Strategy also makes Peace and Security one of the four-fold objectives of 
the partnership.30 The security-development nexus is also presented as shared 
understanding that underpins the objectives for the partnership: ‘Africa and 
Europe understand the importance of peace and security as preconditions for 
political, economic and social development.’ The ‘Peace and Security’ section 
of the Joint Strategy  and its attendant action plan are primarily concerned 
with the EU facilitating African ownership of conflict prevention and conflict 
management and with the EU playing a facilitating, mentoring and assisting 14
role.31 Two key priorities are given to achieving full operationalisation of the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Predictable Funding for 
Africa-led Peace Support Operations.
These two elements of the Action Plan highlight a Sub-Saharan Africa region-
specific aspect of the EU’s SB. This is to sub-contract operational activity to 
African third parties – a preference for local enforcement. This aspect of the EU’s 
SB was systematically codified in the Peace and Security cluster part of the EU 
Strategy for Africa, adopted by the European Council in December 2005. And, 
in turn, was developed at further length in the EU Concept for Strengthening 
African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts in 
November 2006.32  Measures and initiatives proposed in the concept would 
directly support the AU's ongoing establishment of an APSA, including the 
creation of the African Stand-by Force (ASF).
These activities  are being financed via  the  African  Peace  Facility  (APF) 
intended  to  facilitate  the  African  Union  taking  responsibility  for  African 
security. The APF provides EU financial support to facilitate capacity building 
by African states and the AU particularly for the training of African troops to 
perform  peace  and  security  operations.  Building  African  capabilities  also 
diminishes the requirement for direct European military involvement on the 
continent. The APF funding is drawn from the European Development Fund 
(EDF)  and  for  2008-2010  stands  at €300  million.  The  initial  €250  million 
funding of the Facility at its foundation in 2004 proved to be insufficient and 
particularly because of the costs involved with the AMIS operation and which 
saw funding raised to €440 million by 2007.33
In examining a set of the EU’s Strategic Declaratory instruments as indicators of 
the  EU’s  SB it  has  been suggested  that  there  are  three  strands  which  are 15
apparent.  Two  of  these  strands  are  considered  to  be  general  and  generic 
strands  of  the  SB – the  security-development  nexus and  the  human  security 
imperative – and there is a distinctive Sub-Saharan Africa specific strand which 
is the preference for local enforcement. 
5. Strategic behaviour: operational activity
Sub-Saharan Africa has seen the most significant cluster of ESDP activity since 
the initiation of such operations in 2003. These ESDP operations provide an 
important basis from which to assess the operational activity aspects of the 
EU’s behavioural culture. As indicated above the EU has established two key 
strands of its SB and which can be identified through Strategic Declarations: the 
security-development  nexus and  the  human  security  imperative. Through  an 
examination of the Sub-Saharan ESDP operations we can also see the third of 
strand of SB which is the preference for local enforcement.
Each of the individual ESDP operations has been the subject of academic and 
policy analysis.34 This analysis has been primarily to assess the motivations 
behind  the  deployment  of  each  of  the  operations,  the  difficulties  with 
converting the mandate of the GAERC into an ESDP operation, and whether 
the operation constituted a successful realisation of its objectives. A summary 
of each operation is to be found in Appendix A of this paper. The interest for 
the purpose of this paper is to examine these ESDP operations in totality to 
see  what  patterns  can  be  discerned  and  that  are relevant  for  the 
characterisations of the EU’s SB. 
To analyse the nine Sub-Saharan African ESDP operations they will first be 
considered against a typology of operational types and then against a set of 16
rationales providing an indication as to where each fits with the three strands 
of SB outlined above. 
Operational types
The  five-fold  operational  types  are  presented  in  figure  1. The  Sub-Saharan 
ESDP operations have been categorised on the basis of the mandate criteria 
outlined  in  the  Joint  Action  authoring  the  operation.  All  the  EU’s  ESDP 
operations can also be placed on both a civilian-military spectrum and also 
defined in terms of their operation type. Of the Sub-Saharan operations to-
date account for four of these five types with only a border assistance and 
monitoring  mission  type  mission  not  being  deployed.  Through  the  use  of 
these  four  types  of  operations  the  EU  has  generated  a  particular  set  of 
characteristics to the operational aspects of its SB in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Of 
the ESDP deployments to date Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad-Central 
African  Republic, EUNAVFOR  Somalia/Operation  Atalanta,  and  the  EU’s 
support to the African Union's AMIS II operation in Sudan can be viewed as 
at the military end of the civil-military spectrum. As we shall see below the 
circumscribed nature of these operations also fits within the human security 
imperatives identified above. 
Policing and police support operations Two out of the nine ESDP operations to-
date  can  be  characterised  as  this  operational  type:  EUPOL  Kinshasa and 
EUPOL,  DR  Congo.  The  second  of  these  two  operations  was  a  successor 
operation to the first.
Reform-focused operations: Rule of law and security sector reform Two operations 
have been conducted under this category to-date the first the on-going EU 17
security sector reform mission EUSEC, DR Congo. The second operation is also 
ongoing the EU SSR security sector reform mission, Guinea-Bissau.
Figure 1: A typology of ESDP operations
Logistical  assistance Only  one  ESDP  operation  to-date  has  fallen  into  this 
category  which  is  the  EU  support  to  AMIS  (Darfur)  and  which  was  EU 
technical support to the African Union, is to assist it in the mounting of the 
AU’s first-ever large-scale peace support operation (AMIS II) in the Darfur 
Region of Sudan. This was concluded on 31 December 2007 when AMIS was 
succeeded by UNAMID.  
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Military deployments in support of Petersberg tasks Four military deployments 
have take place in support of Petersberg tasks. First, the Artemis operation in
the Congo (June-September 2003). Second, the EUFOR DRC (April-November 
2006)  operation  to  provide  security  for  the  general  election  process in  the 
DRC. The third operation has also been concluded and was the EUFOR Chad-
Central  African  Republic  operation to  protect  the  camps  of  refugees  and 
displaced persons in the east of Chad and the north of the Central African 
Republic. The fourth and final operation of this type to-date is the on-going 
EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta which is devoted to anti-piracy and 
anti-robbery operations off the coast of Somalia.
ESDP operations rationale-types
Each  of  the  ESDP  operations can  also  be  categorised  on  the  basis  of  their 
correspondence to the security-development nexus, the human security imperative
and the preference for local enforcement (see figure 2). 
The assessment of each ESDP operation has been through a combination of 
examination  of  the  mission  mandate,  the  activities  undertaken  during  the 
missions  duration  and  the  actors  involved  in  the  implementation.  The 
material used  as  the  basis for  the  assessment  is the  IISS’s  Strategic  Survey, 
development indices, EU documentation and secondary source analysis.35
The ESDP operations can be categorised according to their correspondence to 
different aspects of the EU’s SB. 
security-development nexus The majority of the EU’s Sub-Saharan African ESDP 
operations  demonstrate  evidence  of  a  the  security-development  nexus  as 19
providing a rationale for intervention. The locations of EU intervention in the 
DRC, the CAR and Guinea-Bissau are all countries that are placed both low 
on the development index and also regions of lack of development and also 
territories assessed as suffering from political instability and conflict.
human security imperative Here the rationale for EU intervention is where the 
EU has placed the individual, rather the state, as the primary security concern 
and has consequently intervened for reasons of the search for human security. 
The  EU’s  Artemis  operation  is  the  most  dramatic  illustration  of  this 
imperative at work.
preference for local enforcement The EU has demonstrated a preference for local 
enforcement in the characteristics of its operations. First, all ESDP operations 
have been of a set duration and with the EU not seeking a prolonged duration 
to its commitment. Second, the EU preference has been to engage in activities 
to supply know-how to increase indigenous capacity as through the EUPOL 
and SSR operations. Or to provide support for African peace keeping capacity 
through the AMIS operation. 
The majority of the EU’s Sub-Saharan African ESDP operations demonstrate 
more than one aspect of the EU’s SB. The only ESDP operation which cannot 
be easily located within this three-fold schema of the EU’s SB is the Atalanta 
operation. This operation is undertaken under the auspices of a UN mandate 
as with all other EU ESDP military deployments. As this operation is at an 
early stage of operation and the most recent of the EU’s ESDP Sub-Saharan 
Africa operations it may demonstrate other aspects of SB as it unfolds.20
Figure 2: ESDP operations rationale-types
This analysis is a provisional attempt at considering the EU’s ESDP operations 
as a part of a specific exercise in attempting to map the EU’s SB. However, 
there is considerable scope for drawing appropriate comparisons between the 
EU’s activities and those of other actors in future work. A key comparator for 
the EU’s activities in Sub-Saharan Africa is that of the United States. There are 
some  potentially  interesting  comparisons  to  be  drawn  here.  As  Olson has 
noted  it  is  striking  to  see  how  willing  the  European  Union  has  been  use 
military forces in Africa in contrast to a greater US reluctance in recent years.36
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6. Conclusion
As this paper  is a preliminary undertaking it is also appropriate  to reflect 
upon  a  number  of  issues  which  will  require  further  consideration  and 
examination in the further empirical work needed to refine the analysis. 
First, the EU’s activities in Sub-Saharan Africa raises the attendant question to 
the extent the experiences have been ‘downloaded’ into the EU’s wider SC. To 
what extent have the EU’s policies pursued through the CFSP/ESDP towards 
Sub-Saharan Africa played a key role in impacting both on the direction of 
development of the totality of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy 
Strategic  Culture and,  crucially,  in  the forms  of  military  intervention 
contemplated in the future?
Second, what is the relationship between the EU’s SB in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and  the  Strategic  Cultures  of  the  individual  member  states?  In  particular, 
because decisions as to when and where to undertake ESDP operations have 
been driven by individual member states. Analysing EU involvement in  Sub-
Saharan  Africa in  a  manner  that  facilitates the study  of  the duality  of the 
ESDP structure and which involves both the SC of individual EU member 
states as well as EU institutions and EU decision-makers has been previously 
identified by analysts.37
Third, where to best seek the evidence for how the EU SC has been generated 
and so to gauge its characteristics and development? This is a problematic 
recognised within the general literature on SC: 
‘Just as all strategy has to be ‘done’ by operations which consist of tactical behaviour, so all 
strategic, operational, and tactical behaviour is ‘done’ by people and organisations that have 
been encultured supranationally, nationally, or sub-nationally.’3822
It is, however, still possible to draw a number of conclusions from the analysis 
within this paper. The case study examination of the EU’s foreign security 
and defence policy engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa has allowed for the 
identification of components of the EU’s SB. The use of Strategic Declarations
that  the  EU  has  made  towards  the  continent  have  allowed  these  to  be 
identified and these have been further validated through examination of the 
ESDP operational activity that has been undertaken. Using the concepts of SB
and SC the paper tentatively suggests that the EU policy pursued towards 
Sub-Saharan African demonstrates three characteristics to the EU’s SB. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has proved to be an invaluable case study through which 
to conduct this examination as over recent years the continent has become an 
increasingly  venue  for  the  EU’s  foreign,  security  and  defence  policy. 
However, as the EU has had a small ‘footprint’ in the region confining its 
activities  for  the  most  part  to  the  Great  Lakes  region  and  conflicts  within 
Central Africa. Consequently it remains to be seen if the EU will expand the 
scope and range of activities on the African continent and whether the SB
identified in this paper gains greater depth.23
APPENDIX A: Sub-Saharan African ESDP Operations to date: an overview
MILITARY OPERATIONS
Title
Overview
Personnel Dates Legal basis Status
Artemis Serious  unrest  erupted  in  Ituri,  a  province  in  eastern 
Congo, in 2003. The town of Bunia was besieged. The EU, 
pending the arrival of a larger United Nations force, and 
taking  over  from  750  blue  helmets.  conducted  in 
accordance  with  the  United 
Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 
2003)
The first of these was the Artemis operation in the Congo 
(June-September 2003). ARTEMIS was mounted at great 
speed,  in  accordance  with  a  UN  Security  Council 
Resolution,  to  provide  an  interim  emergency 
multinational force in Bunia (in the Ituri region of DRC) 
until  such  time  as  the  UN’s  mission  in  DRC  (called 
MONUC) could strengthen  its presence  there. The EU, 
pending the arrival of a larger United Nations force, and 
taking over from 750 blue helmets, deployed a force of 
2,200  troops,  mostly  from  France  (1,700)  and  Sweden 
from  a  total  of  16  EU  (11)  and  non-EU  (5)  countries, 
under the EU’s ‘framework nation’ concept with, in this 
case,  France  providing  the  framework.  This  first 
operation outside of Europe a short-term ‘autonomous’ 
operation  (that  is  one  conducted  without  recourse  to 
NATO assets and capabilities).
5th June 2003 
- 1st
September 
2003
COUNCIL 
JOINT 
ACTION 
2003/423/CFSP
of 5 June 2003
COMPLETED24
EU Support to 
AMIS (Darfur)
The  EU’s  technical support to the  African  Union,  is  to 
assist it in the mounting of the AU’s first-ever large-scale 
peace support operation (AMIS II) in the Darfur Region 
of Sudan. The EU - like NATO - also provided strategic 
transport aid. The operation was broadened in May 2005 
into  a  consolidated  support  package.  With  a  staff  of 
around 50 people (military and police), this civilian and 
military action provided support for the African Union 
troops deployed in Darfur. The latter included: support 
to the African Union’s civil police element, planning and 
technical expertise to their military  chain of command, 
airlift, logistic support, training assistance and advisory 
teams,  aerial  observation,  media  support,  military 
observers,  finance,  and  an  administration  and 
management  coordination  cell,  all  in  transparency  and 
complementarity  with  partners  such  as  NATO. 
Assistance to the African Union is ongoing.
June 2005 –
31st
December 
2007
COUNCIL 
JOINT 
ACTION 
2005/557/CFSP
of 18 July 2005
COMPLETED
EUFOR RD 
Congo
The second of these type operations was the EUFOR DRC
(April-November 2006) aimed to provide security for the 
election  process.  During  the  election  campaign  in  the 
DRC  in  the  spring  of  2006,  maintenance  of  order  in 
Kinshasa was recognized by the UN as a key element for 
the success of the electoral process. Therefore, the EU’s 
Foreign Affairs Council decided, temporarily, to support 
the UN mission (MONUC) already in the country. The 
EUFOR DRC was conducted within the framework of the 
ESDP and was assigned to support MONUC to stabilize 
the situation during the election process, protect civilians 
and protect the airport in Kinshasa.
The military deployment with the operational 
headquarter provided by Germany included an advance 
April-
November 
2006
Council Joint 
Action 
2006/319/CFSP 
– 27 April 
2006.
COMPLETED25
element of almost 1,000 soldiers in and around Kinshasa. 
The EU also had available 1,200 troops on-call ‘over the 
horizon’ in neighbouring Gabon from where they were 
quickly deployable if necessary. The mostly French, 
German and Spanish, were commanded by German 
Lieutenant-General Karlheinz Viereck from the 
headquarters in Potsdam (Germany) and by French 
Lieutenant-General Christian Damay in Kinshasa.
EUFOR 
TCHAD/RCA
The third operation is the EUFOR Chad-Central African 
Republic (15 March 2008-15 March 2009) and established 
to protect the camps of refugees and displaced persons in 
the  east  of  Chad  and  the  north  of  the  Central  African 
Republic. The mission had the objective of facilitating the 
delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of 
humanitarian  personnel.  Soon  after  the  UN  Security 
Council  passed  a  resolution  in  September  2007 
authorizing  the  deployment  of a  military  force  for  one 
year in Eastern Chad and in the North-Eastern part of the 
Central African Republic, the EU signalled it was ready 
to  take  on  the  responsibility  for  implementing  the 
military  mission.  After  months  of  negotiations  and 
discussions  among  the  member  states  and  the  EU 
institutions, the Council of Ministers finally decided on 
28 January 2008, to launch a military operation of up to 
3,700  troops  to  support  and  to  protect  refugees  from 
Darfur and internally displaced people from the region. 
As  with  the  Artemis  operation  this  was  intended  as  a 
prelude to the deployment of the UN's peacekeepers. The 
European force is made up of 3,500 people. Run by Irish 
General Pat Nash (operation commander based in Mont-
Valerien)  and  French  General  Jean-Philippe  Ganascia 
15 March 
2008-15 
March 2009
Council Joint 
Action
2007/677/CFSP 
of 15 October 
2007;
Council 
Decision 
2008/101/CFSP 
of 28 January 
2008
COMPLETED26
(force  commander),  it  has  had  to  overcome  several 
political, logistical and security difficulties.
EU NAVFOR So
malia
The fourth and final operation of this type to-date is the 
EUFOR  naval  operation  in  Somalia  (December  2008-
December 2009). Faced with the increase in the cases of 
piracy  affecting  merchant  or  fishing  vessels,  the 
European Union decided to put in place what is its first 
naval  operation  under  the  ESDP.  Before  legal  and 
political difficulties, it has been decided to put in place a 
small coordination cell, called EU Navco, made up of a 
few officers within the EU's headquarters in Brussels, in 
order  to  ensure  the  liaison  with  all  interested  parties 
(ship  owners  and  marine  organisations,  World  Food 
Programme and NGOs, military coalition CTF 150 run by 
the  Americans).  Decided  in  November,  the  military 
operation should officially start in December, and last for 
one year. It is run by British Rear Admiral Philip Jones, 
based in the British headquarters in Northwood.
December 
2008-
December 
2009
Council Joint 
Action
2008/749/CFSP 
of 19 
September 
2008;
Council 
Decision 
2008/918/CFSP 
of 8 December 
2008;
Council Joint 
Action
2008/851/CFSP 
of 10 
November 
2008
CIVILIAN MISSIONS
Title
Overview
Personnel Dates Legal basis Notes
EUSEC RD 
Congo
EU security sector reform mission EUSEC, DR Congo
(June 2005-June 2009) was launched as a further 
contribution to capacity building in the DRC. This was 
the EU’s first deployment in the field of security sector 
June-
September 
2003
Council Joint 
Action 
2005/355/CFSP 
of 2 May 2005;27
reform. Only nine-staff strong, with a budget of 1.6 
million euros, the EUSEC DR Congo is intended to 
promote security sector reform in the Congolese army. 
The mission provides
advice and assistance with the aim of contributing to a 
successful integration of the Congolese army. In the 
framework of the mission, experts are assigned to key
posts  within  the  Congolese  administration such  as  the 
Private  Office  of  the  Minister  of  Defence,  the  General 
Military  Staff  and  the  National  Commission  for 
Disarmament,  Demobilisation  and  Re-assignment. One 
key  project  addresses  the  chain  of payments  as  in  the 
past, the pay of ‘ghost soldiers’ had been embezzled. The 
implication  is  that  by  being  able  to  impose  a  proper 
chain-of-payment  programme,  EUSEC  will  be  able  to 
ensure  that  Congolese  soldiers  actually  receive  their 
wages. This has involved the biometric census of troops 
(to create ID cards that are impossible to forge and checks 
of ranks) and the organisation of a rapid reaction force.
Council Joint 
Action 
2006/303/CFSP 
of 25 April 
2006;
Council Joint 
Action 
2007/192/CFSP 
of 27 March 
2007;
Council Joint 
Action 
2007/406/CFSP 
of 12 June 2007
Council Joint 
Action 
2008/491/CFSP 
of 26 June 2008
EUPOL Kinshasa EUPOL Kinshasa was launched in April 2005 and entailed 
supporting police reform in the DRC through the training 
of a  specialised  integrated  police  unit  (IPU).  .  The  IPU 
was created in order to secure the transitional institutions 
and  assure  the  protection  of  the  leaders  of  the  former 
warring parties in Kinshasa. The IPU included 1,008 staff, 
who  were  selected  by  the  warring  parties.  As  distrust 
prevailed among these, the IPU played a major role in the 
confidence-building process in Kinshasa and contributed 
to  international  assistance  and  security  for  the  2006 
February 2005-
June 2007
COUNCIL 
JOINT 
ACTION 
2004/847/CFSP
of 9 December 
2004
Council Joint 
Action 
2005/822/CFSP
-21 November 
2005;
COMPLETED28
elections.
The 30-strong EU mission was deployed operating with a 
budget of 4.37 million. And operating in the country at 
the  request  of  the  DRC  Government,  as  a  capacity-
building operation to contribute to the protection of state 
institutions and reinforce internal security.
.
Council Joint 
Action 
2006/300/CFSP
-21 April 2006
EUPOL RD 
CONGO
EUPOL,  DR  Congo (July  2007-June  2009)  succeeded 
EUPOL  Kinshasa,  with  the  the  aim  of  developing  an 
organised crime unit and a command centre in the capital 
to facilitate interaction between the police and the judicial 
system.  EUPOL,  DR  Congo is  staffed  by  around  40 
criminal justice experts from nine member states, as well 
as Switzerland and Angola, and is currently commanded 
by a Portuguese national.
July 2007-June 
2009).
Council Joint 
Action 
2007/405/CFSP 
of 12 June 
2007;
Council Joint 
Action 
2008/38/CFSP 
of 20 
December 
2007
EU SSR Guinea-
Bissau
EU  SSR  security  sector  reform  mission,  Guinea-Bissau 
(June 2008-June 2009 aims to assist in the reform of the 
security sector (police, justice, army), already begun by 
the  government  with  the  support  of  international 
organisations. 
Made up of about 40 people (21 international specialists 
and  18-19  locals),  it  is  run  by  Spanish  General  Juan 
Esteban-Verastegui.
June 2008-June 
2009
COUNCIL 
JOINT 
ACTION 
2008/112/CFSP
of 12 February 
200829
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